Abdul Haq Ansari

Islamic ethics as a discipline or a subject does not exist at the present. We do not have works that define its concept, outline its issues, and discuss its problems. What we have, instead, is a discussion by various writers philosophers, theologians, jurisprudents, sufis and political and economic theorists in their particular fields of some issues that are either part of, or relevant to, Islamic ethics. Philosophers like Abu Nasr al Farabi (d. 329/950) and Abu Ali Miskawayh (d. 421/1030), in their ethical works, have mostly rehashed Greek ethics. True, they have introduced, here and there, some Islamic terms and concepts and modified some notions that hurt their Islamic susceptibilities. But this does not make their ethics Islamic. They do not raise many issues that Islamic ethics must raise, and many ideas they have set forth cannot be considered to be Islamic unless they are seriously modified.

Theologians have, indeed, discussed some very important questions of Islamic ethics, such as the source of ethical knowledge, the meaning of ethical terms, and the basis of moral obligation. The views they have expounded are extremely significant. But they have been treated as part of theology rather than ethics, and they form only one aspect of Islamic ethics. Works on sufism, principles of jurisprudence (usul al fiqh), principles of government and administration (al ahkam al sultaniyah), and public revenue and expenditure (al kharaj), also touch upon ideas that are part of, or relevant to, Islamic ethics. We have in them an analysis, for instance, of some ethical virtues, a discussion on motives, priorities and preferences, levels of obligations, and political and economic justice.

There is, in short, much material scattered in the works of various disciplines that can be utilized to develop Islamic ethics. At present, while the discipline of Islamic ethics does not exist, it can be developed. Thirty years ago, Islamic economics did not exist, but thanks to the devotion of a number of scholars, we now have Islamic economics. I am sure that Islamic ethics will take even less time to develop, provided we give it the required effort. Let us hope this conference of ours initiates the process.

In this paper, I will try first to define the task Islamic ethics should perform, and then review, in that light, various streams of writings to which I have referred, and see what contribution each of these can make to the subject.

The first task of Islamic ethics is to understand and expound the ethos of Islam as conceived in the Qur'an and elaborated in the Sunnah of the Prophet. Although these are the two primary sources of Islamic ethics, one more source should also be taken into account: the practice of the Prophet's Companions. They were trained by the Prophet himself, and their lives as individuals and as a society are the best embodiment of Islamic values, after the example of the Prophet. Further, the life and the practice of the second and third generation leaders (a'immah) of Islam are the next best model of Islamic values and norms. They are almost free from alien ideas and values that affected Islamic society in succeeding generations. This is testified to by the Prophet himself as well as by history. He said: "The best generation is mine, next comes the generation that will follow, and then the generation that will come after."1 It goes without saying that the life of the Companions or of the (a'immah) of the next two generations does not constitute an independent source beside the Qur'an and the Sunnah. It is taken only as an authentic expression of the ideals set forth in them. The life of the peoples in succeeding generations does not enjoy this status, because it bears the influence, in varying degrees, of alien ideas and practices.

To define the Islamic ethos as presented in the Qur'an, the Sunnah, the life of the Companions, and their righteous Successors is the first task of Islamic ethics. The view of the good life (al hayat al tayyibah) for which Islam stands has to be set forth in detail. It has to spell out the various components of that life, the traits and characteristics, motives and attitudes, feelings and emotions, actions and reactions, relations and associations that constitute it. It has to determine the place of human necessities and material conditions in the realization of that life. It has to define the priorities: What goods are higher and what are lower; what is the ultimate end of life, and how are various goods related to that end? It has to study the relation between knowledge, action, and feeling; between personal attainments and social concerns; between devotion to God and commitment to humanity. It has to determine the place of aesthetic values in life, the pleasures of the body, and material goods. It has to show the value of individual work and collective action. In all these things, it has to be viewed in the context of normal life, as well as in extraordinary and stress situations.

Another aspect of the Islamic ethos comes to light when we discuss such questions as what is right and what is meritorious, and, opposingly, what is wrong and what is punishable by God? What is the place of motive and intention in this regard? What are the degrees of obligation, and what are the personal and collective duties? How do the circumstances of the individual and society affect the degree of obligation?

I have talked about good, right, and virtue; similar things can be said about evil and vice. Islamic ethics has to discuss both of these aspects.

The second task before Islamic ethics is to discuss the general terms used in Islamic morals, such as good, bad, right, wrong, meritorious, non-meritorious, responsibility, and obligation. The task has to determine and explain what these terms, or the terms used in Islamic sources communicating these ideas, mean. What are their degrees or levels, and how are they determined? What part is played in their knowledge by reason, intuition, and revelation as incorporated in the Qur'an and the Sunnah? It has to inquire into the ways the language of the Qur'an and the Sunnah expresses or suggests the degree of good and right, evil and wrong. It has to determine what act and practice of the Prophet is the Sunnah to be followed, and what is a personal habit or preference; or what incidental actions and practices are not meant to be followed. The Qur'an and the Sunnah recognize the convention (‘ruf) of the society and accord it a normative value if it belongs to a particular aspect of life. Islamic fiqh regards it as one of its secondary sources, and it is also to be noted by Islamic ethics. Some Sufis have claimed that mystical intuition (kashf), or inspiration, is also a source of ethical knowledge. Others have denied that, and a third group has taken a position in between the two. Some of these problems are the subject of meta-ethics, and others are the concern of moral epistemology.

The third task of Islamic ethics is to discuss how Islamic ethics is related to and influenced by Islamic faith. In Islam, God and the Hereafter are not merely postulates of morality as Kant had though; they determine very much the meaning and content of ethical concepts and values. The distinction between the right and the meritorious, the role of motive, the concept of good and its levels, the nature and scope of virtue all these notions are influenced by the Islamic idea of God, the life Hereafter, prophecy, and revelation. Modern ethics has tried to disengage ethics from metaphysics. But it has failed to see that to deny or not to affirm these realities is also a kind of metaphysical position. Islamic ethics has to point out the different ways in which Islamic faith affects moral life and concepts.

An important issue that falls into this category is the possibility of human freedom and responsibility in the context of Divine omnipotence and predestination. Islamic ethics has to show that the freedom of man, to the extent he is held responsible for his acts, is not contravened by the omnipotence and predestination of God as presented in the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Another issue that falls into this category is whether the norms of rationality, goodness, and justice, applicable to man, are equally applicable to God, or is it that they only partly apply to Him? On the answer to this question rests the theological problem of Divine justice and evil.

The fourth and last task of Islamic ethics is to pronounce judgements on problems that face Islamic society and to say what is right or wrong. To cope with this problem, Islamic ethics will have to define its own dynamics. It will have to specify the values that are permanent and unchangeable, and those whose operational norms may change. To the second category belong, in my view, such values as justice and equality whose scope or level of application may vary according to conditions.2 If the first of these four tasks has been thoroughly accomplished this last one would not be difficult to perform.

These are, in my view, the tasks that Islamic ethics is to accomplish. I will now review various streams of writings mentioned earlier and point out what contribution they can make to Islamic ethics.

The ethics that Abu Nasr Farabi (d. 329/950), Abu ‘Ali Miskawayh (d. 421/1030), Nasir al Din Tusi (d. 672/1273) and Jala al Din Dawwani (d. 908/1502) have elaborated do not touch upon the last three problems I have mentioned. They are only concerned with the first problem, or, rather, with just a part of it, for it discusses the problem of good and leaves out the problem or right. Greek ethics was essentially an ethics of good, and as these writers adopted that ethics they brought no change in its character. Its central question remained as it was, namely, an investigation into the ultimate good or good in itself. The answer that Greek ethics gave to this question was happiness, which Muslim philosophers translated in Arabic and Persian as sa’adah. In the way this concept was originally elaborated, a very comprehensive idea of the good was presented. It included knowledge; moral virtue, individual as well as social; health and the pleasures of the body; material goods; and even the goods of fortune, such as noble birth. Everything found a place in this ideal. This, perhaps, was the reason why it appealed so much to Muslim philosophers.

However, a distinction was made between knowledge, which in its real sense was theoretical or philosophical, and moral virtue. Greek idealism identified the real essence of man with nous or theoretical reason, which alone was to survive the death of the body when it finally perished, never to be revived again. Thus, pure knowledge or contemplation of reality came to be regarded as the ultimate perfection of man and the highest good, while moral virtue or righteous conduct was regarded as the proximate perfection and a lower good.

Muslim philosophers upheld this distinction. Some of them, like Farabi, even considered that nothing was good in itself except knowledge, and made every other good subservient to it.3 Never was it asked whether this concept was consistent with the Islamic ideal of life. Even Imam Ghazali, who followed in their footsteps, did not raise that question.4

Greek ethics analyzed moral or practical perfection in terms of virtues of the faculties of the soul: the rational, the irascive, and the appetitive. The virtue of the rational was wisdom; the virtue of the irascive was courage; the virtue of the appetitive was temperance; and the virtue of the entire soul was justice. Muslim philosophers followed this division and tried to categorize all the virtues of life under these four heads.

One of the glaring defects of this scheme was that religious virtues of Islam, such as faith, trust, love, and worship, could not be accommodated in it. So they were either ignored or were placed where they did not belong. Worship, for instance, was put by Miskawayh under justice,5 where it was obviously a misfit.

The real reason why the Greek scheme of virtue could not express the entire gamut of Islamic virtues lay deeper in its concept of man. According to it, man was only a rational and a moral being. Religion was not a part of his essence, and hence religious virtues could not be treated as a separate class. Muslim philosophers were not able to discern that fact. The only person who realized it was Shah Wali Allah (d. 1176/1762). Consequently, he discarded the Greek scheme of virtue and worked out a different scheme. In place of wisdom (hikmah), courage (shaja’ah), temperance (‘Iffah) and justice (‘adalah), he proposed the virtues of purity (taharah), reverential submission (ikhbat), magnanimity (samahah), and justice (‘adalah). The merit of this scheme is not the point of discussion here. What I want to underline is the fact that Shah Wali Allah realized that justice would not be done to the religious dimension of Islamic life unless its independence was recognized and religious virtues were given a place equal to other virtue.6

Theologians did not enter into normative questions of Islamic ethics. They discussed the source of ethical knowledge, the basis of moral obligation and the meaning of ethical terms. Besides these epistemological and meta-ethical questions, they also discussed the questions of human freedom and responsibility, and Divine justice. They took different positions on these questions. The determinists, for instance, upheld the absoluteness of Divine power, denied the reality of human freedom and responsibility, and did not try to justify Divine justice.

Another group of theologians, the Mu'tazilite free-willers, asserted that man has power and freedom to choose and act, and that this limits the omnipotence of God. Without acceding it, one can justify neither human responsibility nor Divine justice. They said that although a category of things, such as prayer, fasting and sacrifice, is known to be good only through revelation, other goods are known through reason. This includes things that are pleasant or useful, as well as those that are morally good. We know through our reason that truthfulness, justice, and generosity are good; and lying injustice, and miserliness are evil. Further, things are good in themselves; revelation does not make them so__it only confirms an ethical fact. They also said that moral obligation is rational; we know before any revelation may come that it is our duty to tell the truth, keep our promise, and shun lying and injustice. The pronouncements of reason, they said, are binding not only on man but also on God. He must reward the righteous and punish the wicked. This is what they called Divine justice.

Ash'arite theologians opposed the Mu'tazilah on all these counts, but they also did not side with the determinists. They tried to work out a via media between absolute determinism and the self-sufficiency of human will. This was their doctrine of kasb or acquisition. But the way they stated the doctrine appeared to many theologians of the Ahl al Sunnah to be a kind of qualified determinism. I am referring here to such theologians as Ibn Hammam7 (d. 861/1475) of the Maturidi school and Ibn Taymiyah8 (d. 728/13270) among the Salafis. These theologians admitted with the Mu'tazilah that to justify human responsibility and Divine justice one must affirm the efficacy of human will, and, to that extent, restrict Divine activity. This does not mean, however, compromising Divine omnipotence, for the limitation on the activity of God, they said, is not placed by anyone else, but by God Himself. It is he who limits the exercise of His unlimited power and allows man to act, and gives man the will and the power for the purpose.

On the question of ethical knowledge, the Ash’arites were of the opinion that revelation is the only way to know the good and the right. They did not accord any role to reason except in knowing what is pleasant or unpleasant, useful or harmful. Nothing is obligatory, they said, unless revelation commands it. Reason is not the basis of obligation. Some like Abu al Ma'ali al Juwayni (d. 478/1085) and al Shahristani (d. 548/1153) even went to the extent that when we say "X is good" or "Y is a duty," it simply means that "X is approved by the Revelation" or "Y is commanded by the Shariah."9 These words mean nothing else. It follows from this position that nothing can be said to be obligatory on God, and that His actions are not the subject of ethical judgment.

The Maturidis and the Salafi Ibn Taymiyah did not take this position. Agreeing partly with the Mu'tazilah, they said that reason does reveal things that are good, bad, right, or wrong in the ethical sense. But there is a limit to it; there are things that are known to be good and bad only through Revelation. They held a similar view about the basis of obligation. Part of obligations is both rational and revelatory; others are only revelatory. However, no none will be punished by God on his defaults unless he is first warned by a Revelation10. As to the question whether anything is obligatory on God, Ibn Taymiyah said that both the Qur'an and the Hadith affirm it, but only in the sense that God has imposed it on Himself, not in the sense that someone else has obliged Him.11 The Qur'an, for instance, says that "He (i.e., God) has imposed mercy on Himself" (6:12)

Ibn Taymiyah has also pointed out that if something is right or wrong for human beings, it is not necessarily so for God. The proposition that rational judgments are true for every rational being, including God, is not true.12 Some rules, such as speaking the truth and keeping promises, are true for men as well as God. But some things, such as causing death, pain or suffering to creatures, that are wrong for man are not wrong for God.

I have given here only an idea of the various positions that the theologians have taken on ethical questions. No one should get the impression that the positions are as simple as I have presented. There are many variations, and the literature on the subject is very rich and deserves to be thoroughly studied.

Works on the principles of Islamic jurisprudence (usul al fiqh) or on the structure and the objectives of the Islamic Shari'ah have discussed some normative questions and touched on the knowledge of the Shari’ah rules and the basis of their obligation. I will leave these epistemological and meta-legal questions, since the views expressed on these subjects are nothing different from what we have reviewed under theological ethics. I will only refer to a few normative issues.

Ghazali (d. 505/111) in al Mustasfa;, Ibn ‘Abd al Salam (d. 660/1262) in Qawa'id al Ahkam fi Masalih al Anam and Abu Ishaq al Shatibi (790/1388) in al Muwafaqat, to mention a few leading scholars, have raised the question: what is the end or object of the Shari'ah?13 Al Shatibi, who has studied the works of the earlier two writers and discusses the issue at length, give the following answer:

"The rules of the sharia, have been designed to produce goods (masalih) and remove evils, (mafasid) and these are certainly their ends and objects."14 And "the masalih are those which promote the preservation and fulfillment of human life, and the realization of all that the human nature, animal and rational demands, till one is happy in every respect.15

This is an extremely important statement. It underlines very clearly that the purpose of the Shari'ah is to secure the all-round fulfillment of man fulfillment of his body and his soul, his intellect and feelings, his moral being and religious beings, his aesthetic tastes and sensitivities, his individual personality and society. It shows that when a scholar of the Shari'ah, freeing himself or herself from all alien influences, reflects on its structure and its objectives, he or she comes to the conclusion that the Shari'ah aims at a comprehensive and balanced well-being of man.

This, of course, does not mean that all the constituents of this well-being or happiness are equally valuable. Some are, to be sure, more valuable than others, but it is very important to note that everything has a value in itself and is not merely a means or condition for another. Shatibi has discussed the priorities of the Shari'ah. The subject is so intricate that I cannot state it in a few words. However, one thing is clear: Islam does not single out one element of personality, be it knowledge, feeling, action, morality, or religious devotion in short, any good of the body or the soul and say that it is the highest and the ultimate good, and everything else is subservient to it. Shatibi did not begin with idealistic meataphysics, or a doctrine of the soul, or a theory of knowledge as the philosophers did; consequently, he did not extol contemplation over action or knowledge over virtue; no did he downgrade the goods of the body or frown upon its pleasures. All that he wanted, he pleaded, was that one should pursue the objective of the Shari'ah, duly minding the priorities it stands for. If this is done with a view to please God, it is ‘ibadah16, worshipful service to God, which is the object of man's creation according to the Qura'an.17

In these works on the principles of jurisprudence and the philosophy of the Shari'ah there are other points also worthy of note. There is an elaborate discussion in them on the levels of obligation and the factors, individual and social, that may upgrade or downgrade the obligation of individual acts. There is also a discussion on motive and its affect on judgments regarding actions and the recompense thereupon, here or hereafter. A thorough study of these works is necessary to accomplish the fourth task set before Islamic ethics.

It is easy to review philosophical, theological or jurisprudential writings, for there are many common ideas in them. This is not so with Sufi writings. However, at the risk of being charged with simplism, I will say that these writings may be divided into three categories:

One category of writings extolls the ecstatic experience of union with God as the highest goal of human endeavor, ironically calling it tawhid, and urges that the whole life be geared to that end. This is the view of Shaykh ‘Abdullah al-Ansari al-Harawi18 (d. 481/1049).

The second category of writings asserts that it is not ecstatic union but, rather, the realization in knowledge that reality is one is the highest goal. There are different interpretations of this truth, one offered by Ghazali19, the other by Ibn ‘Arabi20 (d. 638/1240).

The third category of writings say, that the ecstatic experience of union with God is only a stage in the spiritual pursuit (suluk) of the mystic. It has to be transcended, and the final and unbridgeable difference between God and the world or man has been realized. That realization is the final end of the Sufi pursuit. The most clear and forceful exponent of this view is Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi21 (d. 1034/1627). He claims that without treading the Sufi path and going through these experiences, one cannot attain the Qur'anic goal of servanthood (ubudiyah), where the will of man merges into the will God; that is, where one wills nothing but the will of God.

In order to realize their goal, Sufis prescribe a discipline of life; a method of purification of the soul; and a way of worship, devotion and contemplation, which are partly based on the teachings of the Prophet, and partly developed in the light of experience. These two components of the Sufi Way (tariqah) vary in their relative strength from group to group and individual to individual. Accordingly, exercises in asceticism, renunciation, devotion, contemplation and ecstasy vary in rigor.

There is a reorientation of the values and norms of life in the light of the goal that Sufis set before themselves and the tariqah they practice. How close or how removed this orientation is from the Prophetic model is a point of study. It is difficult to make a general statement. It may be noted, however, that in this process the Sufis have, at times, deepened our understanding of Islamic virtues, both religious and moral; and they have, at times, diverged from the original understanding, even transformed it.

In the political works of scholars like al Mawardi (d. 450/1058) and Ibn Jama’ah22 (d. 819/1416) or the economic writings of jurists like Qadi Abu Yusuf (d. 182/799) and Abu ‘Ubayd23 (d. 224/838), there are discussions that help us to understand Islamic concepts of political and economic justice. Scholars of the last few decades have uncovered and presented a lot of material on the subject. In the light of this and of the other many relevant ideas they have discussed, the Islamic view on the subject should not be difficult to formulate.

I have tried in this paper to define the concept and the issues of the prospective Islamic ethics. I have also tried to give an idea of the work that has been done on the subject by our scholars in various fields. I am sure that if the scholars of our time take up the challenge, they would get great help and inspiration from the writings of our predecessors in developing an Islamic ethics.

REFERENCES & FOOTNOTES

1. The hadith with little difference in words has been reported by many Companions and recorded by many scholars of hadith: al Bukhari, Sahih, Shahadat 9, fadail ashab al Nabi 1, and other chapters; al Tirmidhi, Sunan, fitan 45, manaqib 56; Ibn Majah, Sunan, ahkam 27; Ahmad, Musnad, Vol. I, 378; Vol. 2, 228; Vol. 4, 267; Vol. 5, 350.

2. I have elaborated this point in my paper "Islamic Values and Change," Islam and the Modern Age, (New Delhi: 1977, Vol. VIII, No. 4), pp. 21-29.

3. Al Farabi, Al Madinah al-Fadilah, ed. Dr. N. Nadir (Beirut: 1956), p. 85; al Risalah fi al’Aql, ed. Maurice Bouyges (Beirut, n.d.)pe. 31-32. See also my book, The Moral Philosophy of al Farabi (Aligarh, India, 1965), pp. 25-27.

4. Al Ghazali, Mizan al’Amal, ed. Sulyman Dunya, (Cairo; Dar al Ma’arif, 1964), pp. 217-222, 195-196.

5. Miskawayh, Tahdhib al Akhlaq, (Beirut: Maktabah al-Hayat, n.d.), p. 196. See also my book, The Ethical Philosophy of Miskawaih, (Aligarh, India: Aligarh Muslim University Press, 1964), p. 109.

6. Shah Wali Allah, Hujjat Allah al Balighah, (Delhi: Kutub Khana Rashidyah, n.d.), Vol. I, pp.53-55; Vol. II, pp. 67-69, 81-87. See also my paper, "Shah Wali Allah's Philosophy of the Islamic Shari’ah," (Karachi: Hamadard Islamicus, Vol. X, No. 4, 1987), pp. 25-33.

7. Ibn Hammam, al Musayarah with the commentary, al Musamarah by Kamal b. Al-Sharif, (Bulaq: al Matba’ah al-Kubrah al-Amiriyah, 1316 A.H.)

8. Ibn Taymiyah, Majmu’ Fatawa Shaykh al Islam ed. ‘Abd al Rahman b. Qasim and his son Muhammad, (Riyadh: 1398 A.H.) Vol. 8: 117.

9. Abu al Ma'ali al Juwayni, Kitab al Irshad, ed. Dr. M. Yusuf Musa and ‘Ali ‘Abd al Mun'im, (Cairo: Maktabah al Khanji, 1950), p. 258; ‘Abd al Karim al Shahristani, Nihayat al-Iqdam, ed. A. Guillaume, (Oxford, 1934), p. 370.

10. Majmu’ Fatawa Ibn Taymiyah, Majmu ‘Fatawa Shaykh al Islam, op. cit. Vol. 8, pp. 435-436.

11. Ibn Taymiyah, Kitab al Tawassul wa al Wasilah, (Cairo: Matba’ al-Manar, 1327 A.H.), pp. 65-66.

12. Ibn Taymiyah, Minhaj al Sunnah, (Beirut: Dar al Kutub al Islamiyah, n.d.), Vol. 1, p. 124

13. Al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa, (Cairo: al Halabi, reprint from Amiriyah, ed. 1322 A.H.), Vol. I, pp. 284-314. Ibn ‘Abd al Salam, Qawa'id al Ahkam fi Masalih al anam, (Beirut: Dar al Jil, 1400/1980), Vol. I. Abu Ishaq al Shatibi, al Muwafaqat fi Usul al Shari'ah, ed. ‘Abdullah al Darraz (Cairo, n. d.), particularly Volume II.

14. Abu Ishaq al Shatibi, al Muwafaqat, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 195.

15. Ibid, Vol. I, p. 25.

16. Ibid, Vol, II, pp. 168-169

17. al-Quran, 51:56.

18. Abdullah al Ansari al Harawi, Manazil al Sa'irin, with commentary by Iskandarani, p. 227

19. See my paper, "The Doctrine of Divine Command: A study in the Development of Ghazali's View of Reality," Islamic Studies, Vol. XXI, No. 3, 1982, pp. 32-36

20. See Abu al ‘Ala al Afifi, al Tasawwuf: Al Thawrah al Ruhiyah fi al Islam (Beirut: Dar al Sha'b, n.d.), 175-184. See his large work, The Mystical philosophy of Muhiyid Din Ibnul ‘Arabi (Cambridge: 1936), reprint Ashraf, Lahore.

21. See my Sufism and Shari'ah: A Study of Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi's Effort to Reform Sufism (Leicester, U.K.: The Islamic Foundation, 1986), pp. 37.

22. Abu al Hasan ‘Ali b. Muhammad al Mawardi's work al Ahkam al Sultaniyah has been published many times. Muhammad b. al Husayn b. Muhammad Khalaf b. al Farra Abu Ya'la (d. 380/990) also has a book with the same title. The name of Muhammad b. Abi Bakr b. ‘Abd al ‘Aziz Ibn Jam'ah's book is Tahrir al Ahkam fi Tadbir ahl al Islam.

23. Qadi Abu Yusufs work is entitled.Kitab al Kharaj. It has been published many times; its translations in various languages have also appeared. Abu Ubayd al Qasim b. Sultan's work is entitled Kitab al Amwal; the edition that is before me is of Maktabah al Tijariyah al Kubra, Cairo, 1353 A.H.