Dr. Israr Ahmad (Translated by Dr. Ahmed Afzaal) In the present article, we shall discuss the practical issues relating to the constitutional and legislative framework of a modern Islamic State, or the structure of the System of Khilafah in modern times. Discourse on the System of Khilafah in the 20th Century The establishment of Hukumat-e-Ilahiyah (i.e., God’s Sovereignty) was the goal before Hizbullah, the short-lived Islamic revivalist party established by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad back in 1913. After the retreat of Maulana Azad, Dr. Abdul Sattar Khairi and Dr. Abdul Jabbar Khairi, the famous Khari Brothers — endeavored for some time to achieve the same goal. It is not clear whether these leaders had any clear framework of the envisioned Hukumat-e-Ilahiyah in their minds. Thus, although the basic principle was well-articulated, practical steps and concrete details regarding how the System of Khilafah will actually function probably remained vague and unclear. The first individual to have systematically applied his intellectual genius in this matter and to have contributed his thoughts was none other than Allama Muhammad Iqbal. He not only explained and elaborated the concept of an Islamic State in his poetry but also presented his observations and opinions about it in his Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. Iqbal has emphasized in his poetry that sovereignty belongs to Almighty Allah (SWT) alone, Who is the Supreme Ruler, and to nobody else. He has also referred to the concept of the vicegerency of man. In the sixth lecture of Reconstruction, entitled "The Principle of Movement in the Structure of Islam," Iqbal has made the following observation:
Concerning the issue of Ijtihad, Iqbal has said:
We have given these two quotes because we fully agree with both of these observations. Unfortunately, some of our intellectuals are presenting a secularized interpretation of Iqbal’s view about Ijtihad, the essence of which is quoted above. Foremost among them is Dr. Javid Iqbal, with whom we strongly disagree on this issue. (Cf., Iqbal, Dr. Javid., "The Problem of Implementing Iqbal’s Ideas in Pakistan" in the Daily Dawn, Magazine Section, June 21, 1998). Allama Iqbal had delivered his famous lectures in 1928. Eleven years later, in 1939, Maulana Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi gave a lecture in Lahore that was later published under the title Islam ka Nazaria-e-Siyasi. As far as theoretical exposition is concerned, we believe that Maulana Maududi was the greatest political scientist among the Muslims of our times. In his above-mentioned booklet, Maulana Maududi has described two key terms in connection with Islamic political doctrine. The first is theo-democracy and the other is popular vicegerency. By coining the term theo-democracy, Maulana Maududi has emphasized the point that the Islamic political system is neither a pure theocracy nor a full-fledged Western style democracy, but that it has elements of both. We would describe the concept of a theo-democracy by borrowing a similitude from a hadith of the Holy Prophet (SAW). According to a tradition reported by Abu Saeed Al-Khudri (RAA) and narrated by Imam Ahmad (RA), the Holy Prophet Muhammad (SAW) compared a believer with a horse that is bound to a peg with a rope. If we extend this similitude a little further, we can see that this can serve as an excellent way of describing the combination of freedom and restriction that is characteristic of a believer’s life. Suppose you have a horse that you do not want to lose, then you must use a rope to restrain it; at the same time, you want the horse to run around a bit so that its muscles may not get weak by disuse. To prevent the horse from running away, you would secure it to a peg; but to make sure that it gets some exercise, you would use a rather long rope. If the rope is 100 meters long, for instance, the horse will be free within this circle of 100 meters radius. The horse can do whatever it wants within that circle, but it cannot go beyond the circle. Applying this similitude to the behavior that is required of us, we can see that although we are free within the limits of the Shari‘ah, we cannot — under any circumstances whatsoever — transgress those limits, as these constitute hudud Allah, the limits set by the Creator Lord. The clear injunctions of Qur’an and Sunnah constitute the hudud Allah which can be neither amended nor abrogated. No one has the authority to change these limits, not even the entire body of a legislative assembly! The restriction of staying within the limits of the Shari‘ah constitutes the theo element in the Islamic political system. There is no special or privileged class of priests or infallible religious divines in Islam. The inclusion of the word theo, therefore, does not imply the rule of any particular ecclesiastic class or group. Instead, it refers to the fact that, just like an individual Muslim, the Islamic State must remain within the limits of the Shari‘ah and must not transgress the hudud Allah. In the similitude described above, the area enclosed by the circle represents all that is lawful, permissible, and legitimate, what is called mubah in Islamic terminology. This circle of freedom deals with what the Holy Qur’an calls amruhum — "their affairs." According to the Qur’an, "…the conduct of their affairs is by mutual consultation…" (Al-Shura 42:38). Of course, no legislative assembly in an Islamic State can change in any way the injunctions of Qur’an and Sunnah, even by full consensus. The "mutual consultation," therefore, is meant only for those affairs in which the choice is between two or more lawful alternatives. In the Islamic scheme of things, if all the available options in a particular case are mubah, the matter should be decided by discussion, deliberation, and mutual consultation. In this regard, there is absolutely nothing wrong if the final decision is reached by a counting of votes. Under the System of Khilafah, all the higher values of democracy can be incorporated within the circle of the lawful or mubah. However, it should be clear that one of the basic principles of democracy that "sovereignty belongs to the people" is totally incompatible with the Islamic spirit, as it challenges the basic Islamic principle of "Divine Sovereignty" which necessitates the supremacy of Qur’an and Sunnah. The second term coined by Maulana Abul Ala Maududi to describe the political theory of Islam was that of popular vicegerency. He coined this term to delineate the fact that Islam rejects the idea of "popular sovereignty." Although this is a satisfactory term, we would suggest an improvement to prevent any misunderstanding. In the Islamic political system, the Khilafah or vicegerency actually belongs to the Muslims rather than to all the citizens of a given nation-state irrespective of their beliefs. Instead of popular vicegerency, therefore, we use the term collective vicegerency of the Muslims. Khilafah — Essence & Form The entire concept of Khilafah is based on the rejection or negation of human sovereignty. The Holy Qur’an repeatedly proclaims that absolute sovereignty belongs to Almighty Allah (SWT) alone. Since human beings cannot claim to be sovereigns, all they are left with, therefore, is vicegerency. Man is not sovereign in his own right, but he is the khalifah of Allah — the vicegerent of God. The Holy Qur’an describes the status of Adam (AS) in these words: "And (remember) when your Lord said to the angels: Verily, I am going to appoint a vicegerent in earth…" (Al-Baqarah 2:30). The relationship between Divine Sovereignty and human vicegerency can be easily understood by means of the following example. Under the Colonial Raj in India, sovereignty belonged to the British King or Queen, but there was always a viceroy present in India whose duty it was to implement the orders that he would receive from His Majesty’s or Her Majesty’s Government. In matters concerning which there was no express order from the sovereign, however, the viceroy was free to evaluate the situation himself and, keeping the fundamental aims of his Government in mind, to take a decision using his best judgment. This is precisely the relationship between Divine Sovereignty and human vicegerency, with one significant difference. The British sovereign needed a viceroy because of the long distance that separated the ruler and the ruled. On the other hand, Almighty Allah (SWT) is Omnipresent and the limitations of time and space do not apply to His Exalted Being. However, the creatures and the Creator are separated by the veil of ghaib: we cannot see Him, neither are we able to communicate with Him directly. Since the Real Sovereign is hidden, a vicegerent is needed to implement His Orders and execute His Will. As far as the actual form of implementation is concerned, the following point should be noted. Before the institution of prophethood was concluded, the prophets of Allah (SWT) were His vicegerents in their individual capacities. In other words, by virtue of the fact that they used to receive direct revelation from Almighty Allah (SWT), all prophets were His representatives on earth; they were responsible for implementing His Orders and executing His Will. This implies that Khilafah, before the conclusion of prophethood, was strictly individual and personal, as it used to be the prerogative of a single person, i.e., the prophet, to implement and execute the orders of the Real Sovereign. Thus, Almighty Allah (SWT) has addressed Prophet Daud (AS) in these words: "O Daud! Verily, We have made you a vicegerent in the earth…." (Saad 38:26). Those who know the Arabic language will appreciate that the address here is in second person singular: Almighty Allah (SWT) is addressing only Prophet Daud (AS). It should also be appreciated that although Prophet Daud (AS) was a king, his rule actually had nothing to do with kingship or monarchy in the ordinary sense — mulukiyyah in Arabic — as he did not rule by his personal whims and desires but, in fact, executed the orders that he received from Almighty Allah (SWT), the Real Sovereign. Thus, Prophet Daud (AS) was a vicegerent of Almighty Allah (SWT) in his personal capacity. In contrast, the Egyptian Pharaohs used to claim the right of absolute sovereignty for themselves, and they did not recognize any Higher Authority whose orders they were supposed to obey and implement. Thus, the rule of Prophet Daud (AS) and that of a Pharaoh were diametrically opposed to each other, although apparently they were both kings! With the advent of Prophet Muhammad (SAW), the institution of prophethood reached its highest echelon and also came to an end. Prophet Muhammad (SAW) was the last person who was a Khlifah of Almighty Allah (SWT) in his personal and individual capacity. The institution of Khilafah can no longer continue as an individual and personal affair after the termination of prophethood, as no one can claim that he is receiving direct revelation from God. Thus, after the demise of the Holy Prophet (SAW), the institution of Khilafah must become the collective affair of the entire Muslim community rather than the individual affair of the prophet. Concerning this, Almighty Allah (SWT) says in the Qur’an: "Allah has promised those among you who believe and do righteous good deeds, that He will certainly grant them Khilafah in the land…" (Al-Noor 24:55). Note that the address here is in the third personal plural, which indicates that Khilafah is now for the collectivity of Muslims rather than for any single individual. There is a very significant point towards which we want to draw your attention. We have just seen how, with the social and intellectual evolution of mankind, Khilafah or vicegerency had to be transformed from an individual responsibility to a collective one. Parallel with this development, the concept and form of human sovereignty has also undergone a crucial transformation. Before the advent of democracy, human sovereignty used to be an individual matter, i.e., a king or monarch would rule the masses according to his personal wishes; now, however, this too has become a collective affair. With the development of the concept of democracy, we now have popular sovereignty instead of individual sovereignty. But note that popular sovereignty is as hateful an evil as individual sovereignty, as both represent a state of rebellion against the Creator. Thus, one of Satan’s advisers observes in Allama Iqbal’s Iblees ki Majils-e-Shura (The Devil’s Parliament):
The point to be noted here is that there is no essential difference between individual sovereignty or monarchy on the one hand and collective sovereignty or democracy on the other. Both are different manifestations of political shirk, both are Satanic in origin, both represent rebellion against God. It was the impact of the liberating teachings of Prophet Muhammad (SAW) in the form of the Just Social Order of Islam that caused common people to realize their rights, and raised their level of self-consciousness and self-respect. Realizing that man is becoming conscious of his status and capabilities and becoming more and more free from all kinds of bondage, Satan saw that it would no longer be possible to lure human beings into submitting before monarchs and autocrats. He, therefore, turned the "king’s right to rule" into the "rule of the masses," hiding the filth of human sovereignty behind the attractive veneer of democracy. Despite their differences, therefore, both democracy and monarchy are based on the assumption that human beings have the absolute right to rule —individually in the first case, collectively in the latter — and this is clearly un-Islamic! Khilafah on the Pattern of Prophethood: Implementation in Modern Times In this context, the following points should be noted: Two terms should be clearly distinguished from each other. Khilafah Ala Minhaj Al-Nabuwwah can be translated as the "System of Caliphate on the pattern of prophethood." This term is applicable both to the era of Al-Khilafah Al-Rashidah — the Rightly Guided Caliphate following the demise of the Holy Prophet (SAW) — as well as to the age of Khilafah that will make its appearance in the future. Although "Caliphate on the pattern of prophethood" will certainly be established in the world, in accordance with the prophecies of the Holy Prophet (SAW), the era of the "Rightly Guided Caliphate" will never be recreated. In other words, there is no possibility of establishing an exact replica of Al-Khilafah Al-Rashidah in modern times. We would substantiate this statement with the following four arguments:
Due to the four reasons given above, it is simply impossible to re-establish an exact replica of Al-Khilafah Al-Rashidah in modern times. Since we cannot recreate as such the Islamic Order as it functioned during the Rightly Guided Caliphate, we must adopt the following principle: We should take the principles and ideals from the model of the Prophet Muhammad (SAW) and the Rightly Guided Caliphs (RAA), and then incorporate these principles and ideals in the political institutions that have been developed in the contemporary civilized world as a result of the process of social evolution. It should be noted that the concepts of political and economic rights of man, which are claimed to have been born and developed in the West, were actually derived and borrowed from the teachings of Prophet Muhammad (SAW). Thus, to say that all human beings are born equal, that every human being has certain inalienable rights (including the provision of basic necessities of life) concerning which there must not be any discrimination on the basis of gender, race, color, caste, or creed, and that all forms of exploitation — whether political or economic — must not be allowed to continue in a decent and humane society, is to express the basic tenets of an ideal Islamic State as given by Prophet Muhammad (SAW), as well as to describe the most remarkable features of the era of Al-Khilafah Al-Rashidah. Both the evolution of social thought and development of political institutions that took place in Europe after the decline of the Muslim Ummah have as their foundations the highest ideals of social justice that were given to mankind by the Holy Prophet (SAW) himself. The movements of Renaissance and Reformation appeared in Europe predominantly under the influence of German, French, and Italian scholars returning from the universities of Cordova, Toledo, and Granada in Muslim Spain, and carrying with them novel and revolutionary ideas. There is, therefore, nothing wrong in taking from the West what she has acquired by the application of principles originating from Islam itself. Just as we use the technological innovations that were developed by non-Muslim scientists, we should also make full use of the modern political institutions — in accordance with the spirit of Islam. (C) As far as the details of the workings of state and government is concerned, there is no definite and binding framework provided to us by the Qur’an and Sunnah. As a matter of fact, all the various forms of government that are in vogue today are essentially permissible in Islam. From an Islamic point of view, it does not make any difference if the government is unitary, confederal, or federal, and whether it is presidential or parliamentary, etc. However, we do need to recognize that the system of the Al-Khilafah Al-Rashidah was a unitary system and closer in spirit to the modern presidential form of government as compared to the parliamentary form. We also need to realize that this is not binding for us. In this regard, the form of government that has been developed in the United States of America represents the highest stage of political evolution, and we can certainly learn a lot from this system. The American form of government is presidential and federal, with maximum autonomy to the states and maximum decentralization of authority. As far as Pakistan is concerned, we believe that the best option is a federal and presidential form of government. At the same time, the decentralization of authority and maximum autonomy of the federating units is a very important requirement of the modern spirit that must not be ignored. It is important to emphasize the point that there is no definite form or structure of government in Islam. All we have been provided with are certain basic principles and ideals that we must uphold and implement, although the exact manner of their implementation may vary according to the changing social and political conditions. In this context, we believe that there are three basic principles that, if incorporated in any form of government, will lead to the establishment of the System of Khilafah. These three principles are as follows:
If these three principles are incorporated in their true spirit in any form of government, it will become an Islamic State or embodiment of the System of Khilafah, irrespective of the specific details of governance. Legislation under the System of Khilafah There is a widespread misconception that there will be no need for legislation in the System of Khilafah. There are people who believe that all that is required today is simply the implementation of the Hanafi fiqh in Pakistan, just as the majority fiqh is being implemented in Iran and Afghanistan. This is not true at all. As a matter of fact, most things are permissible in Islam, and the circle of the forbidden or haram is extremely narrow. Consequently, there is a vast scope for law-making in a modern Islamic State, the only restriction is that no legislation can be done and no decision can be taken at any level that is totally or partially repugnant to Qur’an and Sunnah. As pointed out by Allama Iqbal, law-making must be done through the Parliament so that the viewpoint of the laymen is also included, as they are often better aware of the actual problems faced by the masses and of the facts on the ground, as compared to the scholars and experts of the Islamic law who may become too involved in the technicalities and alienated from hard facts. There is a question of central importance that must be addressed here. What would happen if the Parliament makes a law and someone feels that it transgresses the boundaries set by the Shari‘ah? Who will settle the dispute? We refer to a very important ayah from the Qur’an:
By using the imperative ati‘u (obey!) in connection with Allah (SWT) and His Messenger (SAW) but not with ulul amr, Almighty Allah (SWT) has indicated that the Holy Qur’an and Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad (SAW) are absolute and permanent sources of law, whereas obedience to the rulers is not absolute but must be limited by the injunctions of Qur’an and Sunnah. This ayah goes on to explain that if there is a disagreement as to whether or not the rulers are acting within the limits of the Shari‘ah, the matter must be referred back to the absolute sources of law, Qur’an and Sunnah. There is an obvious vacuum in this ayah, as it does not clarify as to who will settle such a dispute. Once again, we need to take advantage of the political institutions that have developed as a result of human social evolution. If it is settled in the Constitution that no law can be made that is totally or partially repugnant to Qur’an and Sunnah, then the Parliament — made up largely of laymen — will be forced to seek the expertise of Islamic scholars so as to avoid any violation of the Constitution. This does not, however, eliminate the possibility of a dispute or disagreement, and a citizen may still claim that the Parliament is transgressing the Shari‘ah in any particular instance. Since the Judiciary is the custodian of the Constitution, any dispute as to whether a particular law is within the limits set by the injunctions of the Qur’an and Sunnah or whether it violates those limits can be referred to the Supreme Court, which can declare it as invalid in the latter case, forcing the legislative assembly to amend or make an alternate law. Since the question of repugnance to Qur’an and Sunnah is a technical one, it can only be settled in a court where experts from all fields, especially Islamic law, can be called and their arguments can be considered dispassionately. It should also be noted here that when a matter is to be decided in the Court, only the Holy Qur’an and Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad (SAW) would be used as the bases of argument and discussion; the opinions of all the various schools of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) may be used as precedents but they cannot serve as absolute sources of law. Let me mention here a very misguided and totally fallacious opinion that is found in some modernist circles. Some of our modernist intellectuals have argued that the particular and specific injunctions of the Holy Qur’an are not binding on us in a permanent sense, and all we need from the Qur’an are its principles and its general spirit. We strongly reject this argument and believe it to be totally wrong. We have mentioned this only because there is a passage in Allama Iqbal’s Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam that can be interpreted as supporting this view. It is known that Iqbal was not fully satisfied with what he wrote in Reconstruction about this issue, as amply proved by his correspondence with Allama Sayyid Suleman Nadwi even after he delivered the lectures in 1928. However, the actual reason behind Iqbal’s misunderstanding of this issue has come to light only recently, thanks to the painstaking research by Muhammad Suheyl Umar, Director Iqbal Academy. He has conclusively shown in one of his papers that it was Allama Shibli Numani who quoted some passages from Shah Waliyullah in a somewhat distorted manner, which led to a gross misrepresentation of the latter’s true intent. Allama Iqbal, instead of reading the original writings of Shah Waliyullah, relied on the quotations given by Shibli Naumani and was thus misled. (Cf., Muhammad Suheyl Umar., Khutbat-e-Iqbal Nai Tanazur Main, published by Iqbal Academy, Lahore) Here we would like to make some comments on the issue of Ijtihad. Firstly, as far as the right to do Ijtihad is concerned, it should be understood that no restriction could be placed in this regard. Every Muslim, who claims that he has the necessary capacity and skill, can do Ijtihad and express his opinions. Secondly, even though no one can be barred from doing Ijtihad, there is a definite standard of knowledge and expertise that is required for properly carrying out this great endeavor. For the purpose of Ijtihad, the scholar must be well-versed in the traditional Islamic sciences like Arabic language, tafseer, hadith, fiqh, and so on, and he must also be familiar with modern social thought and the problems and issues of the contemporary world. Thirdly, the real issue with respect to Ijtihad concerns the implementing authority. Anyone can do Ijtihad and present his opinion along with the arguments to support it, but not everyone can implement his view by making it a law. This point requires further elaboration. During the age of the Rightly Guided Caliphate, the Khalifah was not only the ruler but he was also a mujtahid, having full capability to do Ijtihad as well as the authority to implement it. This was a unique feature of Al-Khilafah Al-Rashidah that we cannot have in our times. But later, during the age of monarchy or mulukiyyah, especially during the reign of Banu Abbas, the situation changed. Now the rulers had the authority to implement, but they lacked the capacity to do Ijtihad which had by then become the specialization of the scholars of Islamic law, or fuqaha. In this connection, we find that two of our great scholars — Imam Abu Hanifa and Imam Malik — were offered the post of Chief Justice but they both refused to accept it. Had they accepted the offer, their respective opinions and verdicts would have acquired the status of law. However, both of them considered this to be unacceptable and inappropriate. (It may be noted that Qazi Abu Yusuf, a brilliant student of Imam Abu Hanifa, was also offered the same post and he accepted.) A very prominent example of the dichotomy of political authority and the ability to do Ijtihad can be cited from the age of the Mughal rule in India. It is well known that Aurangzeb Alamagir had constituted a committee of the scholars of fiqh who compiled their verdicts according to the Hanafi fiqh. This compilation is called Fatawa-e-Alamgiri, after the name of the King who assigned to these verdicts the force of law. This arrangement was needed because the King lacked the ability to do Ijtihad, and the Ulama had no authority to implement their verdicts. Thus, it is clear that during the age of monarchy it was the King who held the power to make laws, and he would do so by implementing the verdicts and opinions of his favorite and trusted scholars of fiqh. Now consider this question: In our times, who has the authority to make laws? The Parliament, of course! Since anyone can express his opinion, it is possible that ten scholars of fiqh would give ten different verdicts regarding a certain issue. However, only one opinion can acquire the force of law. So we are faced with the question: Whose opinion is to be implemented? The answer is that when the Parliament accepts a certain Ijtihad, then that particular opinion will acquire the force of law. The legislating authority is the Parliament, and not individual fuqaha. This is what Allama Iqbal meant when he approved the "transfer of the power of Ijtihad from individual representatives of schools to a Muslim legislative assembly." It does not mean that the Parliament can make any law and it would be accepted as Islamic just because it was made by a Muslim Parliament. In an Islamic State, the Parliament is not an absolute sovereign but is subject to the injunctions of the Qur’an and Sunnah which it cannot violate. The Parliament consists of the representatives of the people, the majority of which is likely to be laymen rather than experts in Islamic law. As such, the Parliament may not do Ijtihad itself, but it will have the authority to decide as to which particular Ijtihad should be made a law and implemented in the country. However, as we have already made clear, if there is a dispute as to whether the Parliament has transgressed the boundaries set by the Qur’an and Sunnah while making a law, then this issue will be referred to the Supreme Court where all the concerned experts can give their opinions and where the technical aspects of the matter can be carefully examined and adjudicated. In case of a dispute, therefore, the question of repugnance to Qur’an and Sunnah will be decided only by the Judiciary and not by the Parliament. Some Related Issues The first question that we want to discuss here is whether the political system in the future Islamic State will be a multi-party system or a single-party one? Many of us believe that it will be a single-party system because discord and difference of opinion are not permissible in Islam. We believe this view is based on naiveté and lack of knowledge. Multi-party system is an indispensable part of the modern state, and their manifestoes are important means of political education of the masses. Therefore, a modern Islamic State will function under a multi-party system, the only difference is that all political parties will be subject to the same principle which the Parliament has to observe. That is to say, no political party will be allowed to include in its manifesto any item that is repugnant to Qur’an and Sunnah, and the manifesto of any party can be challenged in the Court on this basis. Moreover, after a political party receives the people’s mandate and goes into the Parliament, its individual members must not be subject to the "party whip." If a member of the Parliament develops a disagreement regarding something contained in the manifesto of his party, then he must resign from his seat and seek re-election, because he is now disagreeing with the basic document on the basis of which he was elected. Short of that, however, a member of the Parliament should vote on every particular issue on the basis of his personal judgment and should have total freedom to express his opinion, even if it differs from that of his own party. The second issue concerns the status of non-Muslims in an Islamic State. The basic principle in this regard, even though it is unpalatable for the secular mind, is that only the Muslims are full citizens under the System of Khilafah. Non-Muslims are a protected minority and they do not enjoy full citizenship. Non-Muslims will have the same rights as the Muslims concerning the protection of their lives, property, and honor; they will be allowed to propagate their religion (but only within their own communities); they will be able to compete with Muslims in the job market; the Islamic State will be responsible for safeguarding their places of worship. Despite these rights, however, there are certain matters in which non-Muslims are not treated at par with Muslims. In an Islamic State, non-Muslims cannot take part in the highest level of policy making, neither can they participate in the process of legislation. The topmost priority of an Islamic State, whenever it is established, will be to extend the Islamic Order to other countries. Since non-Muslims do not share this vision with Muslims, they cannot be entrusted to devise, plan, and execute this policy. Similarly, the legislation in an Islamic State will have to be done within the framework of the Qur’an and Sunnah, and those who believe neither in the Qur’an nor in the Sunnah cannot be entrusted to make such laws. Khilafah in Pakistani Perspective Here the following points are noteworthy: (A) With the adoption of the Objectives Resolution on March 12, 1949, it was acknowledged in principle that sovereignty belongs to Allah (SWT), and the authority delegated to us by the Real Sovereign is to be used within the limits of the Qur’an and Sunnah. The opening words of the Resolution are: "Whereas sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Almighty Allah alone, and the authority to be exercised by the people of Pakistan within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust…" (italics added). This, in principle, is the essence of the System of Khilafah. Despite the adoption of this Resolution, however, Islam was not implemented in any concrete manner. The late President Gen. Muhammad Zia ul Haq had made the Objectives Resolution an operative part of the Constitution as article 2-A, but the Supreme Court through its decision dated January 14, 1992, refused to give any special status to this article. In order to make the Objectives Resolution truly operative, it should be specified in article 2-A that this provision shall take precedence over the entire Constitution, notwithstanding anything else contained in the latter. To remove the possibility of any further ambiguity, the following words should be added: "The injunctions of Islam as laid down in Qur’an and Sunnah shall be the Supreme Law of Pakistan." (B) In addition to the Objectives Resolution, we have the imperative to limit all legislation within the bounds set by the Qur’an and Sunnah in article 227 (1) of the Constitution, according to which, "All existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Qur’an and Sunnah, and no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to such injunctions." However, the circuitous route provided for the implementation of this article — through the Council of Islamic Ideology that has absolutely no implementing authority whatsoever — has made this imperative practically ineffective and unproductive. In order to expedite the process of Islamization, therefore, the wordings of article 227 (1) should be incorporated as article 2-B of the Constitution. Since there is no need for the Council of Islamic Ideology after the establishment of the Federal Shariat Court, the article 227 (2) should be deleted. (C) The establishment of the Federal Shariat Court was a step in the right direction. However, the various restrictions placed on its working have rendered it largely ineffective vis-ŕ-vis the Islamization of laws in Pakistan. As a matter of principle, absolutely nothing should be beyond the rule of Qur’an and Sunnah. If we are to have the supremacy of the injunctions of Islam as contained in Qur’an and Sunnah, then this supremacy must be absolute and without any exceptions. Therefore, all restrictions imposed on the Federal Shariat Court should be removed, whether these concern the Constitution, Muslim Personal Law, any law relating to the procedure of any Court or Tribunal, or any law relating to fiscal and banking practices and procedures. At the same time, the number of Ulama Judges in the Federal Shariat Court and the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court should be significantly increased, and the status and terms of appointment of these Judges should be made at par with those of the Judges of High Court and Supreme Court, so as to enable them to work without any pressure. We believe that if the amendments mentioned above are made in the Pakistani Constitution, and at the same time riba is eliminated from the economy, then this will constitute a "soft revolution," as pointed out by Gen. (Rt.) Hameed Gul. Through the cooperative effort of the Federal Shariat Court and the Parliament, un-Islamic laws will be gradually replaced with those that do not transgress the Shari‘ah, and in this way Islamization will be achieved in a gradual manner without any legal vacuum or crisis. (D) It should be made clear in the Constitution that no political party can include anything in its manifesto that is repugnant to the Qur’an and Sunnah, as mentioned above. Party manifestoes could be challenged in the Federal Shariat Court if a citizen feels otherwise, and the Court will then decide the dispute. (E) The President will now be called Khalifah Al-Muslimeen, and he will be the Khalifah of the Muslims belonging to Pakistan. He will not be the Khalifah of Allah, or the vicegerent of God in his individual capacity, rather he will be the vicegerent of the Muslims whom he will represent. Since an Islamic State is based on the collective vicegerency of the Muslims, and since the Muslims will delegate this right to one man through electing him as their ruler, the latter will become their vicegerent. The Khalifah must be a Muslim male, not less than 40 years old (as this is the age of maturity according to the Qur’an), and he would have to pass a very thorough and strict screening process before he can run for this office. Every Muslim man or woman will have the right to vote, and in this respect all Muslims will be treated equally irrespective of whether or not they are practicing Muslims. (F) Ideally, as mentioned above, non-Muslims should not be allowed to take part in the highest level of policy making and legislation in an Islamic State. In a country where non-Muslims are in a significant number, giving them the right of joint electorate would mean that they would be able to influence the election results and therefore the policy making and legislative process. Instead, separate consultative bodies for various communities of non-Muslims can be formed that will advice the Parliament regarding minority affairs. Having said that, however, it should be noted that non-Muslims constitute a very small and therefore insignificant minority in Pakistani. Under these conditions, even if they were given the right of joint electorate, they would not be able to influence the legislative process in any significant measure because of their small number. Under these conditions, we believe that there will be no harm in giving the Pakistani non-Muslims the right of joint electorate on the basis of Meethaq of Madinah, provided it is laid down in the Constitution that no legislation can be done repugnant to Qur’an and Sunnah. Methodology to Establish the System of Khilafah There is only one surefire and reliable methodology for the establishment of Khilafah, namely, one that is derived from the Seerah of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (SAW). However, the details of this methodology and its application in modern times are outside the scope of the present article. The important point here is that the struggle and effort to establish the ascendancy of Islam is obligatory upon each one of us. According to several traditions of the Holy Prophet (SAW), the domination of Islam on a global level is bound to come. The question for us is whether we achieve success and salvation in the Hereafter by participating in this struggle, or whether we remain idle and indifferent and earn Divine Wrath! This choice has to be made by everyone of us.
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Shoba Sama-o-Basr
(Multimedia Department)